Regulatory Benchmarking In Central Europe: Current Practice And Possibilities Of Development For The Energy Sector
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Cited by:
- Ondřej Machek & Jiří Hnilica, 2013. "International Experiences with Using TFP Benchmarking in Energy Industries Regulation," Ekonomika a Management, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(3), pages 62-73.
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More about this item
Keywords
regulatory benchmarking; public utilities benchmarking; Central European utilites; public utilites regulation; regulatory framework;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
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