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An IRS Production Function

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  • Hunter, William J.
  • Nelson, Michael A.

Abstract

Studies the effectiveness of IRS national and field office labor and capital resource allocation. Finds that the IRS can improve collection with no additional resources -- if it reallocates its resources (via reductions in national office staff and increases uses of technological advances).

Suggested Citation

  • Hunter, William J. & Nelson, Michael A., 1996. "An IRS Production Function," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 49(1), pages 105-115, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:49:y:1996:i:1:p:105-15
    DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41789189
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:scandj:v:89:y:1987:i:2:p:183-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sandmo, Agnar, 1981. "Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity--efficiency tradeoff," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 265-288, December.
    3. Slemrod, Joel, 1990. "Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 157-178, Winter.
    4. Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Graetz, Michael J. & Wilde, Louis L., 1990. "The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 1977-1986," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(4), pages 395-409, December.
    5. Hunter, William J & Nelson, Michael A, 1995. "Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 53-67, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jaime Vázquez-Caro & Richard M. Bird, 2011. "Benchmarking Tax Administrations in Developing Countries: A Systemic Approach," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1104, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    2. Elena Villar Rubio & Pedro Enrique Barrilao González & Juan Delgado Alaminos, 2017. "Relative efficiency within a tax administration: The effects of result improvement," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 9(1), pages 135-149, February.
    3. Day‐Yang Liu & Hsin‐Hsin Yao & Wen‐Min Lu & Cheng‐Hsien Lin, 2020. "Impulse response function analysis of the impacts of land value‐added tax policy on government performance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(6), pages 1020-1032, September.
    4. Petros Dellaportas & Evangelos Ioannidis & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2021. "Sample size determination for risk‐based tax auditing," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 184(2), pages 479-493, April.
    5. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 897-926, December.
    6. Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    7. Serra, Pablo, 2003. "Measuring the Performance of Chile’s Tax Administration," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 56(2), pages 373-383, June.
    8. Martin Besfamille & Pablo Olmos, 2010. "Inspectors or Google Earth? Optimal fiscal policies under uncertain detection of evaders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    9. Avellón Naranjo, Blanca & Prieto Jano, María José, 2017. "Los factores determinantes de la eficiencia en la gestión de las Administraciones Tributarias Autonómicas españolas/The Determinants of Efficiency in the Tax Management of the Spanish Regional Tax Adm," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 35, pages 749-776, Agosto.
    10. Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2005. "Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(5), pages 639-663, September.
    11. Daniel Sutter & Lee Coppock, 2003. "The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 107-118, June.

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