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Is Divided Government a Cause of Legislative Delay?

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  • Kirkland, Patricia A.
  • Phillips, Justin H.

Abstract

Despite the compelling theoretical prediction that divided government decreases legislative performance, the empirical literature has struggled to identify a causal effect. We suspect that a combination of methodological challenges and data limitations are to blame. Here, we revisit this empirical relationship. Rather than relying on traditional measures of legislative productivity, however, we consider whether divided government affects the ability of lawmakers to meet critical deadlines — specifically, the ability of state lawmakers to adopt an on-time budget (as mandated by state law). By focusing on delay instead of productivity we avoid measurement problems, particularly the challenges inherent in measuring the supply of and demand for legislation. To assess the causal effect of divided government, we develop and implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that accounts for the multiple elections that produce unified or divided government in separation of powers systems. Our RDD approach yields compelling evidence that divided government is a cause of delay. We also evaluate and find support for a new hypothesis that divided government is more likely to lead to delay when the personal and political costs that stalemate imposes on politicians are low.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirkland, Patricia A. & Phillips, Justin H., 2018. "Is Divided Government a Cause of Legislative Delay?," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 13(2), pages 173-206, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00017041
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00017041
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    Cited by:

    1. Matteo Cervellati & Giorgio Gulino & Paolo Roberti, 2024. "Random Votes to Parties and Policies in Coalition Governments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(5), pages 1553-1588, September.
    2. Luca Repetto & Maximiliano Sosa Andrés, 2022. "Divided Government and Polarization: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence from US States," CESifo Working Paper Series 9823, CESifo.
    3. Sung Eun Jung & Yongmin Kim, 2022. "Party Competition Structure and Legislative Productivity of Local Councils: From the 4th to 6th Local Councils in Korea," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-15, February.
    4. Lang (Kate) Yang, 2020. "Intergovernmental Costs of Political Gridlock: Local Government Cash Flow Smoothing during State Budgetary Delays," Public Finance Review, , vol. 48(1), pages 102-134, January.
    5. Alvaro Forteza & Juan S. Pereyra, 2021. "Separation of powers with ideological parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 333-382, July.
    6. Repetto, Luca & Andrés, Maximiliano Sosa, 2023. "Divided government, polarization, and policy: Regression-discontinuity evidence from US states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).

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