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Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

Author

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  • Amil Dasgupta
  • Vyacheslav Fos
  • Zacharias Sautner

Abstract

We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we provide a detailed characterization of key aspects of the legal and regulatory setting within which institutional investors govern portfolio firms. Third, we synthesize the evolving response of the recent theoretical and empirical academic literature in finance to the emergence of institutional investors in corporate governance. We highlight how the defining aspect of institutional investors – the fact that they are financial intermediaries – differentiates them in their governance role from standard principal blockholders. Further, not all institutional investors are identical, and we pay close attention to heterogeneity amongst institutional investors as blockholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Amil Dasgupta & Vyacheslav Fos & Zacharias Sautner, 2021. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 12(4), pages 276-394, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:fntfin:0500000056
    DOI: 10.1561/0500000056
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    4. Anisa Safiah Maznorbalia & Muhammad Aiman Awalluddin & Ardzlyn Hawatul Yuhanis Ayob, 2023. "Exploring the role of institutional investors in voting, monitoring and dialogue engagement in mitigating agency conflict in Malaysia’s public listed companies," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-9, December.
    5. Caselli, Stefano & Gatti, Stefano & Chiarella, Carlo & Gigante, Gimede & Negri, Giulia, 2023. "Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    6. Cvijanović, Dragana & Dasgupta, Amil & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022. "The Wall Street stampede: Exit as governance with interacting blockholders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 433-455.
    7. Ameen Qasem & Shaker Dahan AL-Duais & Wan Nordin Wan-Hussin & Hasan Mohamad Bamahros & Abdulsalam Alquhaif & Murad Thomran, 2022. "Institutional Ownership Types and ESG Reporting: The Case of Saudi Listed Firms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-23, September.

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