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Ex-ante moral hazard: empirical evidence for private health insurance in Brazil [Risco Moral Ex-ante: uma evidência empírica para o setor de seguro saúde privado no Brasil]

Author

Listed:
  • Ana Carolina Maia

    (USP)

  • Mônica Viegas Andrade

    (UFMG)

  • Flávia Chein

    (UFJF)

Abstract

Este artigo explora a existência de risco moral ex-ante no setor de saúde suplementar no Brasil. Antes do evento da doença, indivíduos com plano/seguro saúde não têm incentivos para procurar cuidado preventivo se esse não for contratado previamente. O conjunto de dados utilizado inclui registros administrativos longitudinais da utilização de cuidados de saúde de um plano de saúde brasileiro patrocinado pelo empregador. A estratégia empírica é baseada em uma mudança exógena e antecipada na cobertura de seguro de saúde não associada à condição de saúde. Os resultados mostram um aumento de até 17% nas consultas médicas e 22% nos exames diagnósticos. As consultas médicas começam a aumentar a partir do quinto mês antes do indivíduo deixar a carteira com um pico em dois meses. Para testes diagnósticos, o maior aumento foi observado em um e dois meses antes da perda da cobertura do plano de saúde.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Carolina Maia & Mônica Viegas Andrade & Flávia Chein, 2019. "Ex-ante moral hazard: empirical evidence for private health insurance in Brazil [Risco Moral Ex-ante: uma evidência empírica para o setor de seguro saúde privado no Brasil]," Nova Economia, Economics Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil), vol. 29(3), pages 987-1008, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:nov:artigo:v:29:y:2019:i:3:p:987-1008
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, 2009. "Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-390, December.
    3. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    4. Cameron,A. Colin & Trivedi,Pravin K., 2013. "Regression Analysis of Count Data," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107014169, November.
    5. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
    6. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459, Elsevier.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    risco moral ex-ante; plano de saúde; auto-seguro; setor de saúde suplementar no Brasil;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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