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A Deferential Role for Efficiency Analysis in Unravelling the Takings Tangle

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  • Paul Burrows

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  • Paul Burrows, 1997. "A Deferential Role for Efficiency Analysis in Unravelling the Takings Tangle," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 24, pages 105-123.
    • Handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:24:y:1997:p:105-123
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    File URL: http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_1997_a08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2002. "Economic analysis of law," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1661-1784, Elsevier.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Paul Burrows, 1991. "Compensation for Compulsory Acquisition," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(1), pages 49-63.
    4. Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December.
    5. Farber, Daniel A., 1992. "Economic analysis and just compensation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-138, June.
    6. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Burrows, 1999. "A Deferential Role for Efficiency Theory in Analysing Causation-Based Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 29-49, July.

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