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SwissDRG: Ein Vergütungssystem mit ungleichen finanziellen Risiken für die Spitäler?

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  • Widmer, Philippe K.

Abstract

In 2012, Switzerland changed from retrospective to prospective hospital payment based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), following the example of the United States, Aus- tralia, and Germany. As in these countries, the objective of this transition was to motivate hospitals to improve efficiency by making them bear financial risk to some extent. This contribution seeks to find out whether SwissDRG, the Swiss version of DRG payment, in- deed provides hospitals with appropriate incentives, thus creating a level playing field en- abling workable competition between them. The empirical evidence relates to some 757,000 patient cases treated by 93 hospitals in the year 2012. It suggests that hospital payment as currently devised by SwissDRG fails to create a level playing field. Differences in margins over cost of treatment can be traced to a hospital’s portfolio of specialties and mix of patients, both of which are largely beyond their control.

Suggested Citation

  • Widmer, Philippe K., 2016. "SwissDRG: Ein Vergütungssystem mit ungleichen finanziellen Risiken für die Spitäler?," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 70(3), pages 210-226.
    • Handle: RePEc:nms:untern:10.5771/0042-059x-2016-3-210
    DOI: 10.5771/0042-059X-2016-3-210
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    References listed on IDEAS

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