IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/neo/journl/v14y2018i2p11-19.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cooperation Among Eu Banking Supervisory Authorities: A Game Model

Author

Listed:
  • MIROSLAV NEDELCHEV

    (Economic Research Institute, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

The aim of the paper is carrying out of survey for cooperation among banking supervisors based on the model of cooperative games. The initial measures of supervisors are aimed at rescuing the banking assets in their territory and to reduce losses to local taxpayers. The new reality demands these measures also to take into account the effects on other countries, and the need for cooperation among banking supervisors through ex-ante engagements for sharing ex-post costs. The results of paper show that the original measures to reduce the effects of global crisis have triggered short-term stabilization of the banking system at predominance of national interests. Using game theory for cooperation among banking supervisors leads to optimization of outcome for all countries participating in the ex-ante engagements. From the concrete case for a Bulgarian bank, part of an EU banking group, we have concluded that cooperation among more than two supervisors is recommended depending on the structure of the banking group.

Suggested Citation

  • Miroslav Nedelchev, 2018. "Cooperation Among Eu Banking Supervisory Authorities: A Game Model," Economics and Management, Faculty of Economics, SOUTH-WEST UNIVERSITY "NEOFIT RILSKI", BLAGOEVGRAD, vol. 14(2), pages 11-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:neo:journl:v:14:y:2018:i:2:p:11-19
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://em.swu.bg/images/SpisanieIkonomikaupload/Spisanieikonomika2018/COOPERATION%20AMONG%20EU%20BANKING%20SUPERVISORY.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://em.swu.bg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=664:cooperation-among-eu-banking-supervisory-authorities-a-game-model&catid=29:2018&Itemid=116
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Ms. María Nieto & Mr. Garry J. Schinasi, 2007. "EU Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability: Towards an Analytical Benchmark for Assessing its Effectiveness," IMF Working Papers 2007/260, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Vítor Gaspar, 2010. "Financial Stability and Policy Cooperation," Working Papers o201001, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    4. Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2004. "Cooperation in international banking supervision," Working Paper Series 316, European Central Bank.
    5. Miroslav Nedelchev, 2016. "New Framework Of Banking Supervision In The European Union," Entrepreneurship, Faculty of Economics, SOUTH-WEST UNIVERSITY "NEOFIT RILSKI", BLAGOEVGRAD, vol. 4(2), pages 287-300.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, 2022. "Financial spillovers, spillbacks, and the scope for international macroprudential policy coordination," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 79-127, February.
    2. Haritchabalet, Carole & Lepetit, Laetitia & Spinassou, Kévin & Strobel, Frank, 2017. "Bank capital regulation: Are local or central regulators better?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 103-114.
    3. Elisabetta Montanaro, 2016. "The process towards centralisation of the European financial supervisory architecture: The case of the Banking Union," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 69(277), pages 135-172.
    4. Hertig Gerard & Lee Ruben & McCahery Joseph A., 2010. "Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 171-215, January.
    5. Beatrix Paal & Bruce D. Smith, 2013. "The sub-optimality of the Friedman rule and the optimum quantity of money," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 911-948, November.
    6. König, Philipp J. & Pothier, David, 2018. "Safe but fragile: Information acquisition, sponsor support and shadow bank runs," Discussion Papers 15/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    7. Alberto Giovannini, 1990. "European Monetary Reform: Progress and Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(2), pages 217-292.
    8. Contessi, Silvio & De Pace, Pierangelo & Guidolin, Massimo, 2020. "Mildly explosive dynamics in U.S. fixed income markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(2), pages 712-724.
    9. Holger Wolf, 2008. "Rethinking banking supervision in the EU," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 357-361, February.
    10. Weerachart T. Kilenthong & Robert M. Townsend, 2014. "A Market Based Solution to Price Externalities: A Generalized Framework," NBER Working Papers 20275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-00841167 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Ethan B Kapstein, 2006. "Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors," BIS Working Papers 199, Bank for International Settlements.
    13. Sim, Khai Zhi, 2024. "Bank bailouts: Moral hazard and commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    14. Caballero, Ricardo J. & Krishnamurthy, Arvind, 2004. "Smoothing sudden stops," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 104-127, November.
    15. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," CID Working Papers 21, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    16. Yaron Leitner, 2004. "Financial networks: contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts," Working Papers 02-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    17. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
    18. Wang, Wen-Yao & Hernandez-Verme, Paula, 2009. "Multiple Reserve Requirements, Exchange Rates, Sudden Stops and Equilibrium Dynamics in a Small Open Economy," MPRA Paper 13802, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    20. Joshua Aizenman & Jaewoo Lee, 2007. "International Reserves: Precautionary Versus Mercantilist Views, Theory and Evidence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 191-214, April.
    21. Dooley, Michael P., 2000. "International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 361-377, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking supervision; game theory; cooperative games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:neo:journl:v:14:y:2018:i:2:p:11-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Vladislav Krastev (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feswubg.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.