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Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: the Concept of Limit Information

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  • Valery M. Marakulin

    (Institute of Mathematics, RAS, Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract

In this paper, a new concept of "limit information" is introduced and studied for Arrow-Debreu type economies with asymmetrically informed agents. The concept is based on the so-called contractual approach that presumes that agents meet and form coalitions, where the concurrent exchange of commodities and information is realized. So, in the course of a natural exchange process, the agents' information is repeatedly transformed and accumulated, and agents learn and achieve limit information. It is proved that, for a monotone information sharing rule, limit information is unique, i.e., it does not depend of the chain of coalitions implemented in the process of interaction between economic agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Valery M. Marakulin, 2009. "Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: the Concept of Limit Information," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 62-85.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2009:i:1-2:p:62-85
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Wilson, 2005. "Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 55-64, Springer.
    2. Marakulin Valery, 2003. "Contracts and domination in incomplete markets," EERC Working Paper Series 02-04e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. Marakulin Valery, 2006. "On convergence of contractual trajectories in pure exchange economies," EERC Working Paper Series 06-07e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exchange economy; contract; asymmetrical information; core;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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