The Belgian deposit guarantee scheme in a European perspective
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References listed on IDEAS
- Reint Gropp & Jukka Vesala, 2004.
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Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
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More about this item
Keywords
deposit assurance; financial institutions; financial crisis; moral hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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