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The puzzle of human cooperation

Author

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  • Ernst Fehr

    (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich)

  • Simon Gächter

    (University of St Gallen)

Abstract

The claim by Johnson et al. that human cooperation in social-dilemma games violates rational-choice theory is not justified1. If people have altruistic aims, altruistic behaviour is a rational means by which to achieve their proximate goals. From an evolutionary viewpoint, we need to explain why humans are often altruistic by strong reciprocity2,3,4. Although kin selection, reciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity explain relevant forms of human cooperation5,6,7, they do not ultimately explain strong reciprocity8.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2003. "The puzzle of human cooperation," Nature, Nature, vol. 421(6926), pages 912-912, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:421:y:2003:i:6926:d:10.1038_421912a
    DOI: 10.1038/421912a
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    Cited by:

    1. Hao, Weijuan & Hu, Yuhan, 2024. "The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 470(C).
    2. D. Darcet & D. Sornette, 2008. "Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 3(2), pages 137-163, December.
    3. Lespiau, Florence & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Kaminski, Gwenaël, 2021. "Keeping it for yourself or your sister? Experimental evidence on birth order effects on resource distribution between kin and non-kin," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    4. Shen, Yong & Lei, Wei & Kang, Hongwei & Li, Mingyuan & Sun, Xingping & Chen, Qingyi, 2023. "Evolutionary dynamics of public goods game with tax-based rewarding cooperators," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 175(P1).
    5. Murnighan, J. Keith & Wang, Long, 2016. "The social world as an experimental game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 80-94.

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