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Emergence of stable polymorphisms driven by evolutionary games between mutants

Author

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  • Weini Huang

    (Evolutionary Theory Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology)

  • Bernhard Haubold

    (Bioinformatics Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology)

  • Christoph Hauert

    (The University of British Columbia)

  • Arne Traulsen

    (Evolutionary Theory Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology)

Abstract

Under neutrality, polymorphisms are maintained through the balance between mutation and drift. Under selection, a variety of mechanisms may be involved in the maintenance of polymorphisms, for example, sexual selection or host-parasite coevolution on the population level or heterozygote advantage in diploid individuals. Here we address the emergence of polymorphisms in a population of interacting haploid individuals. In our model, each mutation generates a new evolutionary game characterized by a payoff matrix with an additional row and an additional column. Hence, in general, the fitness of new mutations is frequency-dependent rather than constant. This dynamical process is distinct from the sequential fixation of advantageous traits and naturally leads to the emergence of polymorphisms under selection. It causes substantially higher diversity than observed under the established models of neutral or frequency-independent selection. Our framework allows for the coexistence of an arbitrary number of types, but predicts an intermediate average diversity.

Suggested Citation

  • Weini Huang & Bernhard Haubold & Christoph Hauert & Arne Traulsen, 2012. "Emergence of stable polymorphisms driven by evolutionary games between mutants," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:3:y:2012:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms1930
    DOI: 10.1038/ncomms1930
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaitanya Gokhale & Arne Traulsen, 2014. "Evolutionary Multiplayer Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 468-488, December.
    2. Viswanathan, Karthik & Wilson, Ashly & Bhattacharyya, Sirshendu & Hens, Chittaranjan, 2024. "Ecological resilience in a circular world: Mutation and extinction in five-species ecosystems," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    3. Benjamin Wölfl & Hedy te Rietmole & Monica Salvioli & Artem Kaznatcheev & Frank Thuijsman & Joel S. Brown & Boudewijn Burgering & Kateřina Staňková, 2022. "The Contribution of Evolutionary Game Theory to Understanding and Treating Cancer," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 313-342, June.
    4. Park, Junpyo, 2021. "Evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors system by changing community paradigm with population flow," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    5. Stefano Giaimo & Xiang-Yi Li & Arne Traulsen & Annette Baudisch, 2018. "Evolution of fixed demographic heterogeneity from a game of stable coexistence," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 38(8), pages 197-226.
    6. Bin Wu & Julián García & Christoph Hauert & Arne Traulsen, 2013. "Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(12), pages 1-7, December.
    7. Bin Wu & Arne Traulsen & Chaitanya S. Gokhale, 2013. "Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(2), pages 1-18, May.
    8. Zhong, Li-Xin & Xu, Wen-Juan & Chen, Rong-Da & He, Yun-Xin & Qiu, Tian & Ren, Fei & Shi, Yong-Dong & Zhong, Chen-Yang, 2020. "Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    9. Gokhale, Chaitanya S. & Hauert, Christoph, 2016. "Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 28-42.

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