IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nas/journl/v122y2025pe2416708122.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Behavioral nudges prevent loan delinquencies at scale: A 13-million-person field experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Kuan

    (a Department of Operations, Information and Decisions, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania , Philadelphia , PA 19104)

  • Kristin Blagg

    (b Center on Education Data and Policy, The Urban Institute , Washington , DC 20024)

  • Benjamin L. Castleman

    (c The Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia , Charlottesville , VA 22904)

  • Rajeev Darolia

    (e The James W. Martin School of Public Policy and Administration, University of Kentucky , Lexington , KY 40506)

  • Jordan D. Matsudaira

    (f Department of Public Administration and Policy, The School of Public Affairs, American University , Washington , DC 20016)

  • Katherine L. Milkman

    (a Department of Operations, Information and Decisions, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania , Philadelphia , PA 19104)

  • Lesley J. Turner

    (g The Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago , Chicago , IL 60637)

Abstract

Americans collectively hold over $1.6 trillion in student loan debt, and over the last decade millions of borrowers have defaulted on loans, with serious consequences for their financial health. In a 13-million-person field experiment with the U.S. Department of Education, we tested the effectiveness of different email interventions to inform borrowers about alternative repayment options after a missed loan payment. Our interventions tested whether sending monthly behaviorally-informed emails, providing follow-up reminders, framing benefits in percentage (vs. dollar) terms, and providing just one recommended action step at a time (vs. two) affected borrower outcomes. We find that i) behaviorally-informed emails reduce estimated 60-d delinquencies by 0.42 pp, ii) reminders boost the efficacy of such emails by 0.57 pp, iii) describing potential savings in percentage terms is more effective than describing these benefits in dollar terms, reducing estimated delinquencies by 0.14 pp, and iv) encouraging two actions (i.e., enrollment in income-driven repayment plans and auto debit programs) repeatedly across two emails is marginally more effective than encouraging one action at-a-time across two emails, reducing estimated delinquencies by 0.05 pp. Overall, if scaled to all 13-million borrowers in our experiment, we estimate that our best-performing intervention would have averted approximately 79,800 60-d delinquencies. Our findings i) highlight the benefits of describing potential savings in percentage terms, which may magnify perceived savings for recipients, ii) underscore the risks of oversimplification, and iii) demonstrate that nudges can be an effective, low-cost complement to other policies for reducing delinquencies and supporting borrowers with student loan debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Kuan & Kristin Blagg & Benjamin L. Castleman & Rajeev Darolia & Jordan D. Matsudaira & Katherine L. Milkman & Lesley J. Turner, 2025. "Behavioral nudges prevent loan delinquencies at scale: A 13-million-person field experiment," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 122(4), pages 2416708122-, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:122:y:2025:p:e2416708122
    DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2416708122
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2416708122
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1073/pnas.2416708122?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:122:y:2025:p:e2416708122. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: PNAS Product Team (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.pnas.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.