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Constrained public benefits from global catch share fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • Abdulrahman Ben-Hasan

    (Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada; Department of Marine Science, College of Science, Kuwait University, Kuwait City, Kuwait)

  • Santiago De La Puente

    (Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada)

  • Diana Flores

    (Intelfin Estudios y Consultoría S.A.C. (Sociedad Anónima Cerrada), San Isidro 15047, Peru; Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106)

  • Michael C. Melnychuk

    (Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada; School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195)

  • Emily Tivoli

    (Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1L4, Canada; Queen's Economics Department, Queen's University, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada)

  • Villy Christensen

    (Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada)

  • Wei Cui

    (Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada)

  • Carl J. Walters

    (Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada)

Abstract

Across publicly owned natural resources, the practice of recovering financial compensation, commonly known as resource rent, from extractive industries influences wealth distribution and general welfare of society. Catch shares are the primary approach adopted to diminish the economically wasteful race to fish by allocating shares of fish quotas—public assets—to selected fishing firms. It is perceived that resource rent is concentrated within catch share fisheries, but there has been no systematic comparison of rent-charging practices with other extractive industries. Here, we estimate the global prevalence of catch share fisheries and compare rent recovery mechanisms (RRM) in the fishing industry with other extractive industries. We show that while catch share fisheries harvest 17.4 million tons (19% of global fisheries landings), with a value of 17.7 billion USD (17% of global fisheries landed value), rent charges occurred in only 5 of 18 countries with shares of fish quotas primarily allocated free of charge. When compared with other extractive industries, fishing is the only industry that consistently lacks RRM. While recovering resource rent for harvesting well-governed fishery resources represents a source of revenue to coastal states, which could be sustained indefinitely, overcharging the industry might impact fish supply. Different RRM occurred in extractive industries, though generally, rent-based charges can help avoid affecting deployment of capital and labor to harvest fish since they depend on the profitability of the operations. Our study could be a starting point for coastal states to consider adapting policies to the enhanced economic condition of the fishing industry under catch shares.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdulrahman Ben-Hasan & Santiago De La Puente & Diana Flores & Michael C. Melnychuk & Emily Tivoli & Villy Christensen & Wei Cui & Carl J. Walters, 2021. "Constrained public benefits from global catch share fisheries," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 118(39), pages 2021580118-, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:118:y:2021:p:e2021580118
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Byrne, Conor & Oostdijk, Maartje & Agnarsson, Sveinn & Davidsdottir, Brynhildur, 2024. "The Transitional Gains Trap in Grandfathered Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    2. Farahmand, Shekoofeh & Hilmi, Nathalie & Cinar, Mine & Safa, Alain & Lam, Vicky W.Y. & Djoundourian, Salpie & Shahin, Wassim & Ben Lamine, Emna & Schickele, Alexandre & Guidetti, Paolo & Allemand, Den, 2023. "Climate change impacts on Mediterranean fisheries: A sensitivity and vulnerability analysis for main commercial species," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).

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