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Voluntary restrictions on self-reliance increase cooperation and mitigate wealth inequality

Author

Listed:
  • Jörg Gross

    (Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands)

  • Robert Böhm

    (Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark; Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark; Copenhagen Center for Social Data Science, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark)

Abstract

Humans are considered a highly cooperative species. Through cooperation, we can tackle shared problems like climate change or pandemics and cater for shared needs like shelter, mobility, or healthcare. However, cooperation invites free-riding and can easily break down. Maybe because of this reason, societies also enable individuals to solve shared problems individually, like in the case of private healthcare plans or private retirement planning. Such “self-reliance” allows individuals to avoid problems related to public goods provision, like free-riding or underprovision, and decreases social interdependence. However, not everyone can equally afford to be self-reliant, and amid shared problems, self-reliance may lead to conflicts within groups on how to solve shared problems. In two preregistered studies, we investigate how the ability of self-reliance influences collective action and cooperation. We show that self-reliance crowds out cooperation and exacerbates inequality, especially when some heavily depend on collective action while others do not. However, we also show that groups are willing to curtail their ability of self-reliance. When given the opportunity, groups overwhelmingly vote in favor of abolishing individual solutions to shared problems, which, in turn, increases cooperation and decreases inequality, particularly between group members that differ in their ability to be self-reliant. The support for such endogenously imposed interdependence, however, reduces when individual solutions become more affordable, resonating with findings of increased individualism in wealthier societies and suggesting a link between wealth inequality and favoring individual independence and freedom over communalism and interdependence.

Suggested Citation

  • Jörg Gross & Robert Böhm, 2020. "Voluntary restrictions on self-reliance increase cooperation and mitigate wealth inequality," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(46), pages 29202-29211, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:29202-29211
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gross, Jörg & De Dreu, Carsten K.W. & Reddmann, Lennart, 2022. "Shadow of conflict: How past conflict influences group cooperation and the use of punishment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    2. Vorlaufer, Tobias & Steimanis, Ivo, 2023. "Solidarity under heterogenous adaptation costs: Experimental evidence on coping after climate hazards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    3. Li, Wen-Jing & Chen, Zhi & Jin, Ke-Zhong & Wang, Jun & Yuan, Lin & Gu, Changgui & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Perc, Matjaž, 2022. "Options for mobility and network reciprocity to jointly yield robust cooperation in social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 435(C).
    4. Ryutaro Mori & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Tatsuya Kameda, 2024. "An outside individual option increases optimism and facilitates collaboration when groups form flexibly," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 15(1), pages 1-13, December.

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