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Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Anna Lou Abatayo

    (Ettore Bocconi Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan 20136, Italy; Centre for Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy, and Networks, Bocconi University, Milan 20136, Italy)

  • Valentina Bosetti

    (Ettore Bocconi Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan 20136, Italy; Centre for Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy, and Networks, Bocconi University, Milan 20136, Italy; RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan 20144, Italy)

  • Marco Casari

    (Department of Economics, Bologna University, Bologna 40126, Italy; Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305)

  • Riccardo Ghidoni

    (Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan 20126, Italy; CentER, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, 5037AB Tilburg, Netherlands)

  • Massimo Tavoni

    (RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan 20144, Italy; Center for European Studies, Politecnico di Milano, Milan 20156, Italy; Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, Politecnico di Milano, Milan 20156, Italy)

Abstract

Climate engineering—the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s climate system—is a set of technologies for reducing climate-change impacts and risks. It is controversial and raises novel governance challenges [T. C. Schelling, Climatic Change , 33, 303–307 (1996); J. Virgoe, Climatic Change , 95, 103–119 (2008)]. We focus on the strategic implications of solar geoengineering. When countries engineer the climate, conflict can arise because different countries might prefer different temperatures. This would result in too much geoengineering: the country with the highest preference for geoengineering cools the planet beyond what is socially optimal at the expense of the others—a theoretical possibility termed “free-driving” [M. L. Weitzman, Scand. J. Econ., 117, 1049–1068 (2015)]. This study is an empirical test of this hypothesis. We carry out an economic laboratory experiment based on a public “good or bad” game. We find compelling evidence of free-driving: global geoengineering exceeds the socially efficient level and leads to welfare losses. We also evaluate the possibility of counteracting the geoengineering efforts of others. Results show that countergeoengineering generates high payoff inequality as well as heavy welfare losses, resulting from both strategic and behavioral factors. Finally, we compare strategic behavior in bilateral and multilateral settings. We find that welfare deteriorates even more under multilateralism when countergeoengineering is a possibility. These results have general implications for governing global good or bad commons.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Lou Abatayo & Valentina Bosetti & Marco Casari & Riccardo Ghidoni & Massimo Tavoni, 2020. "Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(24), pages 13393-13398, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:13393-13398
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    Cited by:

    1. Riccardo Ghidoni & Anna Lou Abatayo & Valentina Bosetti & Marco Casari & Massimo Tavoni, 2023. "Governing Climate Geoengineering: Side Payments Are Not Enough," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(5), pages 1149-1177.
    2. Cooper, Adam C.G. & Lioté, Laurent & Colomer, Chloé, 2023. "We need to talk about engineering policy," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    3. Kim, Yeong Jae & Cho, Seong-Hoon & Sharma, Bijay P., 2021. "Constructing efficient portfolios of low-carbon technologies," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).

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