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Valutazione antitrust delle concentrazioni in mercati oligopolistici

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  • Michele Grillo
  • Lara Magnani

Abstract

How can dominance be detected in oligopolistic markets as a result of a merger? Oligopoly is the realm of "interdependent" behaviour. Thus the well-established definition of the ECJ, that identifies dominance with "independent" behaviour, is inappropriate to oligopolistic markets. In the paper we suggest that a dominant position should be detected whenever a merger induces a "stable and asymmetric change" in the merging firm's strategic incentives, as compared with those of the rival firms. Following the suggested interpretation, we show that the European test of "dominance" is equivalent to the US test of "substantial lessening of competition".

Suggested Citation

  • Michele Grillo & Lara Magnani, 2004. "Valutazione antitrust delle concentrazioni in mercati oligopolistici," Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 217-238.
    • Handle: RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/13243:y:2004:i:1:p:217-238
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    Cited by:

    1. Pier Luigi Parcu, 2006. "European dominant position and american monopolization: a unifying approach from basic game theory," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 59(237), pages 171-192.
    2. Pier Luigi Parcu, 2006. "European dominant position and american monopolization: a unifying approach from basic game theory," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 59(237), pages 171-192.

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