IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mth/ber888/v8y2018i3p104-117.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Capital Structure and Political Risk in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Companies Listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius

Author

Listed:
  • Lydie Myriam Marcelle Amelot
  • Subadar Agathee Ushad
  • Mattew Lamport

Abstract

Cashman, Harrison and Scheiler (2014) stated that companies with less political risk will use more debts than other organisations in other countries with more exposure to political risk. In particular, when there are low political risks, there will be more leverage and when there is high political uncertainty, there will be low debts indicating a negative relationship between financial leverage and political risk (Cashman, 2015). To this effect, this study will investigate the link between capital structure and political risk in an emerging market such as Mauritius. The data sample includes 30 financial and non- financial companies listed on the Stock exchange of Mauritius over a time frame ranging from 2011 to 2015 with a total number of 135 observations. The political risk was based on two World Bank indicators, namely political change index and corruption perceptions index. Based on a panel regression model, the empirical results show an insignificant relationship between financial leverage and political risk. In particular, it is implied that there is little evidence on the importance of political risk on firms¡¯ decision in Mauritius due to the fact that Mauritian companies consider other types of risks to be more relevant when taking on more debts. The study adds to the existing literature on emerging markets and highlights the specificity of the Mauritian equity market relative to other developed markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Lydie Myriam Marcelle Amelot & Subadar Agathee Ushad & Mattew Lamport, 2018. "Capital Structure and Political Risk in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Companies Listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 8(3), pages 104-117, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:8:y:2018:i:3:p:104-117
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/13367/10676
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/13367
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kesternich, Iris & Schnitzer, Monika, 2010. "Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 208-218, November.
    2. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R, 2001. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 179-198, April.
    3. Lubos Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, 2012. "Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(4), pages 1219-1264, August.
    4. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    5. James Ming Chen, 2017. "Risk and Uncertainty," Quantitative Perspectives on Behavioral Economics and Finance, in: Econophysics and Capital Asset Pricing, chapter 0, pages 189-211, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Hui Chen, 2010. "Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2171-2212, December.
    7. Pástor, Ľuboš & Veronesi, Pietro, 2013. "Political uncertainty and risk premia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 520-545.
    8. Cashman, George D. & Deli, Daniel N., 2009. "Locating decision rights: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 645-671, November.
    9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    10. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:1:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, 2002. "Market Timing and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 1-32, February.
    12. Fraser, Donald R. & Zhang, Hao & Derashid, Chek, 2006. "Capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1291-1308, April.
    13. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sun, Xian, 2009. "Political connections and the process of going public: Evidence from China," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 696-719, June.
    14. Fatemi, Ali M., 1988. "The effect of international diversification on corporate financing policy," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 17-30, January.
    15. Campbell, Gareth & Rogers, Meeghan, 2018. "Capital structure volatility in Europe," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 128-139.
    16. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2009_007 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    18. Chang, Eric C. & Wong, Sonia M.L., 2004. "Political control and performance in China's listed firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 617-636, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marcelin, Isaac & Stephen, Sheryl-Ann K. & Fanta, Fassil & Tecklezion, Mussie, 2019. "Political regimes, investment and electoral uncertainty," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 580-599.
    2. Liu, Jinyu & Zhong, Rui, 2017. "Political uncertainty and a firm's credit risk: Evidence from the international CDS market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 53-66.
    3. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Girma, Sourafel & Shah, M. Eskandar & Williams, Jonathan, 2014. "Dynamic capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 117-128.
    4. Gu, Xian & Hasan, Iftekhar & Zhu, Yun, 2019. "Political influence and financial flexibility: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 142-156.
    5. Çolak, Gönül & Gungoraydinoglu, Ali & Öztekin, Özde, 2018. "Global leverage adjustments, uncertainty, and country institutional strength," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 41-56.
    6. Tarek A Hassan & Stephan Hollander & Laurence van Lent & Ahmed Tahoun, 2019. "Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(4), pages 2135-2202.
    7. Zengji Song & Abraham Nahm & Zongyi Zhang, 2015. "The value of partial state ownership in publicly listed private sector enterprises: evidence from China," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 336-353, September.
    8. Deng, Yuping & Wu, Yanrui & Xu, Helian, 2019. "Political turnover and firm pollution discharges: An empirical study," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    9. Zhou, Zhengyi, 2017. "Government ownership and exposure to political uncertainty: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 152-165.
    10. Nys, Emmanuelle & Tarazi, Amine & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2015. "Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 83-104.
    11. Bill Francis & Eric Ofori, 2015. "Political regimes and stock market development," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(1), pages 111-137, June.
    12. Braam, Geert & Nandy, Monomita & Weitzel, Utz & Lodh, Suman, 2015. "Accrual-based and real earnings management and political connections," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 111-141.
    13. Jun Su & Jia He, 2010. "Does Giving Lead to Getting? Evidence from Chinese Private Enterprises," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 73-90, April.
    14. repec:zbw:bofitp:2013_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Janbaz, Mehdi & Hassan, M. Kabir & Floreani, Josanco & Dreassi, Alberto & Jiménez, Alfredo, 2022. "Political risk in banks: A review and agenda," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    16. Emmanuelle Nys & Amine Tarazi & Irwan Trinugroho, 2013. "Political Connections, Bank Deposits, and Formal Deposit Insurance: Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Working Papers hal-00916513, HAL.
    17. Zhang, Cheng & Yang, Chunhong & Liu, Cheng, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking: Loss aversion or opportunity expectations," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    18. Li, Guoping & Zhou, Hong, 2015. "Political connections and access to IPO markets in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 76-93.
    19. Bose, Udichibarna & MacDonald, Ronald & Tsoukas, Serafeim, 2019. "Policy initiatives and firms' access to external finance: Evidence from a panel of emerging Asian economies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 162-184.
    20. Akbel, Basak & Schnitzer, Monika, 2011. "Creditor rights and debt allocation within multinationals," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1367-1379, June.
    21. Disli, Mustafa & Schoors, Koen & Meir, Jos, 2013. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 804-819.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital structure; Political risk; Corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:8:y:2018:i:3:p:104-117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Technical Support Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.