IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mir/mirbus/v5y2015i8p65-78.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Directors’ Remuneration Disclosure Transparency in Nigeria and the Influence of Block Share Ownership

Author

Listed:
  • Robert W. Odewale

    (University Utara Malaysia.)

  • Hasnah Kamardin

    (University Utara Malaysia.)

Abstract

This paper examines directors’ remuneration disclosure transparency in an emerging economy (Nigeria). We specifically examine how the block share ownership influences the level of transparency in the disclosure of directors’ remuneration in a sample of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2012. Using ordinary least squares and binary logistic regressions to examine the relationship, we find that block share ownership is associated with lower transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration. The result shows a positive relationship between audit quality and transparent disclosure of directors’ remuneration. The study finds that the transparency score is less than 40%. On the whole, we provide evidence that managers in Nigerian Listed Companies are inclined not to make voluntary disclosure of their remuneration to the public. This paper has implication for policy makers and regulatory authorities in Nigeria on the need to embark on remuneration disclosures reforms so as to make directors’ remuneration disclosure mandatory for Nigerian Listed Companies to make it comparable with accepted global good practice. This study contributes to the remuneration disclosure transparency literature by providing support for the expropriation hypothesis in the behaviour of block shareholders from an emerging economy whose market is very much different from those of developed economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Odewale & Hasnah Kamardin, 2015. "Directors’ Remuneration Disclosure Transparency in Nigeria and the Influence of Block Share Ownership," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 5(8), pages 65-78, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:mir:mirbus:v:5:y:2015:i:8:p:65-78
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://thejournalofbusiness.org/index.php/site/article/view/819/549
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, 2013. "Say on pay laws, executive compensation, CEO pay slice, and firm value around the world," International Finance Discussion Papers 1084, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Becker, Bo & Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2011. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 907-942, August.
    3. Elewechi N. M. Okike, 2007. "Corporate Governance in Nigeria: the status quo," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 173-193, March.
    4. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi, 2011. "Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, February.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    7. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    8. Vafeas, Nikos & Afxentiou, Zaharoulla, 1998. "The association between the SEC's 1992 compensation disclosure rule and executive compensation policy changes," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 27-54.
    9. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne & Larcker, David F., 2008. "The power of the pen and executive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-25, April.
    10. K. J. Martijn Cremers & Yaniv Grinstein, 2014. "Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(3), pages 921-960.
    11. Michael N. Young & Mike W. Peng & David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 196-220, January.
    12. Steven N. Kaplan, 2012. "Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges," NBER Working Papers 18395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert W. Odewale & Hasnah Kamardin, 2015. "Directors’ Remuneration Disclosure Transparency in Nigeria and the Influence of Block Share Ownership," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 5(8), pages 65-78, August.
    2. Christian Engelen, 2015. "The effects of managerial discretion on moral hazard related behaviour: German evidence on agency costs," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(4), pages 927-960, November.
    3. Katarzyna Cieślak, 2018. "Agency conflicts, executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from Sweden," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(3), pages 535-563, September.
    4. Wang, Qiong & Qiu, Muqing, 2023. "Strength in numbers: Minority shareholders' participation and executives' pay-performance sensitivity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Gregorio Sánchez‐Marín & María Encarnación Lucas‐Pérez & Samuel Baixauli‐Soler & Brian G.M. Main & Antonio Mínguez‐Vera, 2022. "Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2817-2837, October.
    6. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
    7. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    8. Yusuf, Fatima & Yousaf, Amna & Saeed, Abubakr, 2018. "Rethinking agency theory in developing countries: A case study of Pakistan," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 281-292.
    9. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    10. Dah, Mustafa A. & Frye, Melissa B., 2017. "Is board compensation excessive?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 566-585.
    11. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    13. Ruth V. Aguilera & Valentina Marano & Ilir Haxhi, 2019. "International corporate governance: A review and opportunities for future research," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(4), pages 457-498, June.
    14. C.S. Agnes Cheng & Iftekhar Hasan & Feng Tang & Jing Xie, 2024. "Market Feedback Effect on CEO Pay: Evidence from Peers’ Say-on-Pay Voting Failures," Working Papers 202408, University of Macau, Faculty of Business Administration.
    15. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, January.
    16. He, Yan & Chiu, Yung-ho & Zhang, Bin, 2015. "The impact of corporate governance on state-owned and non-state-owned firms efficiency in China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 252-277.
    17. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    18. Onal, Bunyamin & Petmezas, Dimitris & Xiong, Nan, 2022. "Societal equality sentiment and executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    19. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi & Guido Ferrarini, 2017. "Executive remuneration standards and the “conformity gap” at controlled corporations," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 573-597, September.
    20. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 158-209, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mir:mirbus:v:5:y:2015:i:8:p:65-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: M Kabir (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csmirus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.