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Economic Growth and Institutional Reform in Modern Monarchies and Republics: A Historical Cross-Country Perspective 1820-2000

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  • Christian Bjørnskov
  • Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Abstract

Conventional arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. We employ a panel of 27 countries observed from 1820 to 2000 to estimate these differences. Results show no significant growth differences between the two regime types. Effects of incremental reforms do not differ between them, but those of large-scale reforms do. Specifically, we find a strong valley-of-tears effect of large reforms in republics, and monarchies benefit from such reforms in the ten-year perspective adopted here. We offer some tentative thoughts on the underlying mechanisms responsible for the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Bjørnskov & Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Economic Growth and Institutional Reform in Modern Monarchies and Republics: A Historical Cross-Country Perspective 1820-2000," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(3), pages 453-481, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201409)170:3_453:egairi_2.0.tx_2-u
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13946249258832
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J, 1996. "Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
    2. Toke S. Aidt & Martin Gassebner, 2010. "Do Autocratic States Trade Less?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 24(1), pages 38-76, January.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Income and Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-842, June.
    4. Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1996. "Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 243-276, June.
    5. Christian Bjørnskov, 2007. "Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 1-21, January.
    6. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. New paper on the political economy of monarchy
      by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard in Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard on 2014-04-23 19:00:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Bjørnskov & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2013. "Is trust the missing root of institutions, education, and development?," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 157(3-4), pages 641-669, December.
    2. Arif, Imran & Hall, Joshua C., 2019. "International flows of people and institutional change," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 276-288.
    3. Bjørnskov, Christian, 2022. "Coups and Economic Crises," Working Paper Series 1449, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. Kana Inata, 2021. "Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 501-518, June.
    5. George Tridimas, 2014. "Why some democracies are headed by a monarch?," ICER Working Papers 07-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    6. Mazaheri Nimah, 2013. "The Saudi monarchy and economic familism in an era of business environment reforms," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 295-321, October.
    7. Imhof Sina & Gutmann Jerg & Voigt Stefan, 2016. "The Economics of Green Constitutions," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 305-322, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P17 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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