Corporate Design for Regulability. Comment
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Christoph Engel, 2006.
"Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 104-124, March.
- Christoph Engel, 2005. "Corporate Design for Regulability. A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Makowsky, Michael D. & Wang, Siyu, 2018. "Embezzlement, whistleblowing, and organizational architecture: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 58-75.
- Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010.
"Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, September.
- Schöttner, Anja & Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Promotion tournaments and individual performance pay," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2007-045, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021.
"On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Arijit Mukherjee & Sugata Marjit, 2004.
"R&D organization and technology transfer,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 243-258, May.
- Arijit Mukherjee & Sugata Marjit, 2001. "R&D organization and technology transfer," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/02, Department of Economics, Keele University.
- Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore, 2018.
"Collusion constrained equilibrium,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
- Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2016. "Collusion Constrained Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001288, David K. Levine.
- Christoph Engel, 2006. "The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_1, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999.
"Corruption, extortion and evasion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1996. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Papers 179, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers 9809, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, 2002. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1671, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Guriev, Sergei, 2004.
"Red tape and corruption,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
- Guriev, Sergei, 2003. "Red Tape and Corruption," CEPR Discussion Papers 3972, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Post-Print hal-03595530, HAL.
- Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03595530, HAL.
- Maitreesh Ghatak & François Maniquet, 2019.
"Universal Basic Income: Some Theoretical Aspects,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 895-928, August.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Maniquet, Francois, 2019. "Universal Basic Income: Some Theoretical Aspects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13635, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maitreesh Ghatak & François Maniquet, 2019. "Universal basic income: some theoretical aspects," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, "undated".
"Informational opacity and honest certication,"
BDPEMS Working Papers
2013001, Berlin School of Economics.
- Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo, 2014. "Informational opacity and honest certification," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 481, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, 2013. "Informational Opacity and Honest Certification," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1291, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Thiele, Veikko, 2007.
"Performance measurement in multi-task agencies,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 148-163, September.
- Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies," MPRA Paper 2469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo, 2009. "Managers’ Compensation And Misreporting: A Costly State Verification Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 278-289, April.
- Robin, Stéphane & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014.
"Ingratiation: Experimental evidence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 16-38.
- Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00911556, HAL.
- Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00911556, HAL.
- Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
- Arjona Trujillo, Ana María, 2002. "La corrupción política: una revisión de la literatura," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. EconomÃa. DE de021404, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Michela Cella, 2011.
"Monitoring subcontracting in a suppliers' hierarchy,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 523-548, July.
- Michela Cella, 2005. "Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers` Hierachy," Economics Series Working Papers 233, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Michela Cella, 2009. "Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers' Hierarchy," Working Papers 172, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009.
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996.
"On the optimality of allowing collusion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Working Papers 93-02, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- David C. Chan, 2018. "The Efficiency of Slacking off: Evidence From the Emergency Department," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(3), pages 997-1030, May.
- Chiara Canta & Helmuth Cremer, 2023.
"Asymmetric information, strategic transfers, and the design of long-term care policies,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 117-141.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Canta, Chiara, 2020. "Asymmetric information, strategic transfers, and the design of long-term care policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 15421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chiara Canta & Helmuth Cremer, 2020. "Asymmetric Information, Strategic Transfers, and the Design of Long-Term Care Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 8677, CESifo.
- Chiara Canta & Helmuth Cremer, 2023. "Asymmetric information, strategic transfers and the design of long-term care policies," Post-Print hal-04076813, HAL.
- Canta, Chiara & Cremer, Helmuth, 2020. "Asymmetric information, strategic transfers, and the design of long-term care policies," TSE Working Papers 20-1156, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Kanishka Dam & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2020. "Race to collusion: Monitoring and incentive contracts for loan officers under multiple-bank lending," Discussion Papers 20-05, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200603)162:1_130:cdfr_2.0.tx_2-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.