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Yes-Men and No-Men: Does Defiance Signal Talent?

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  • Jeong-Yoo Kim
  • Keunkwan Ryu

Abstract

We provide the rationale for the existence of yes-men and no-men in an organization or a group. On one hand, a person is inclined to conform to the instruction of another, because he cannot ignore the information contained in the instruction, even though his own evidence contradicts the instruction. On the other hand, if only the person himself knows the accuracy of his own information, he may tend to disobey the instruction, to make others believe that he is able in the sense that his information is accurate. We demonstrate that disobedience can signal high ability in an equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeong-Yoo Kim & Keunkwan Ryu, 2003. "Yes-Men and No-Men: Does Defiance Signal Talent?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(3), pages 468-490, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200309)159:3_468:yandds_2.0.tx_2-7
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerd Muehlheusser & Andreas Roider, 2004. "Black Sheep and Walls of Silence," Diskussionsschriften dp0410, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    2. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2013. "Yes Men in Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 621-659, December.
    3. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 413, Hunter College Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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