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A Theory of Ownership Arrangements and Smooth Transition

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  • Guoqiang Tian

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical model that determines the optimal ownership arrangement in an imperfect market and government institutional environment, especially in transitional economies. It studies the interdependence of institutional environments and ownership arrangements. The theory developed sheds some light on predicting how the transition from a command economy to a free market economy takes place. It shows that an ownership arrangement may not be changed effectively without changing economic and political institutional environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Guoqiang Tian, 2001. "A Theory of Ownership Arrangements and Smooth Transition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 380-412, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200109)157:3_380:atooaa_2.0.tx_2-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Kai Guo & Yang Yao, 2005. "Causes of privatization in China," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 13(2), pages 211-238, April.
    2. Tong, Sarah Y., 2009. "Why privatize or why not? Empirical evidence from China's SOEs reform," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 402-413, September.
    3. Boudewijn Bouckaert, 2007. "Bureaupreneurs in China: we did it our way," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 169-195, April.
    4. Liu, Deqiang & Otsuka, Keijiro, 2004. "A Comparison of Management Incentives, Abilities, and Efficiency between SOEs and TVEs: The Case of the Iron and Steel Industry in China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 759-780, July.
    5. Lotta Moberg & Vlad Tarko, 2021. "Special economic zones and liberalization avalanches," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 120-139, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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