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Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic Development

Author

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  • Chun-Lei Yang

Abstract

Real-world rent seeking has been a puzzle to political economists, as they cannot observe as much direct social cost as commonly believed. In this paper, we identify socially inefficient technology commitment as a device for rent seekers to improve their positions in a zero-dissipation contest. We show that the domestic industry may forgo innovation opportunities which would be optimal decisions without rent-seeking uncertainty. This analysis also explains some conspicuous features of the farm subsidy programs in the US. We conclude by discussing rent-seeking's dynamic implication: the retarding of economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Chun-Lei Yang, 1998. "Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic Development," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 640-640, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199812)154:4_640:rstcae_2.0.tx_2-l
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    Cited by:

    1. Kabiraj, Tarun & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2001. "Licensing vs. Innovation incentives under uncertain government policies," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-261, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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