IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/finarc/urnsici0015-2218(201212)684_365pfpitp_2.0.tx_2-g.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Prudent Fiscal Policy in the Presence of Bailout Expectations

Author

Listed:
  • Zarko Y. Kalamov

Abstract

This paper analyzes the introduction of an automatic correction mechanism (ACM) in an economic union whose member states expect to be bailed out in the case of a debt crisis. An ACM can be used to penalize governments that run deficits. We show that if the mechanism is appropriately structured, it can harden the governmental budget constraints. Thus, in the presence of an ACM, bailout expectations of a regional government do not lead to excessive borrowing. However, we find that simultaneous introduction of an ACM and a credible commitment not to bail out indebted regions may lead to inefficiently hard budget constraints and an overshoot of the policy objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Zarko Y. Kalamov, 2012. "Prudent Fiscal Policy in the Presence of Bailout Expectations," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(4), pages 365-382, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201212)68:4_365:pfpitp_2.0.tx_2-g
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X659538
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/prudent-fiscal-policy-in-the-presence-of-bailout-expectations-101628001522112x659538
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1628/001522108X659538?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
    2. Kothenburger, Marko, 2004. "Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 498-513, May.
    3. Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2006. "A Theory of Fiscal Imbalance," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(1), pages 1-27, March.
    4. Kothenburger, Marko, 2007. "Ex-post redistribution in a federation: Implications for corrective policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 481-496, April.
    5. Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
    6. Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2006. "Does tax competition soften regional budget constraint ?," Post-Print halshs-00094283, HAL.
    7. Toshihiro Ihori, 2011. "Overlapping tax revenue, soft budget, and rent seeking," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(1), pages 36-55, February.
    8. Breuille, Marie-Laure & Madies, Thierry & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle, 2006. "Does tax competition soften regional budget constraint?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 230-236, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 197-215, March.
    2. Steve Billon, 2023. "Tax Competition and Leviathan with Decentralized Leadership," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 79(2), pages 93-110.
    3. Foremny, Dirk, 2011. "Vertical aspects of sub-national deficits: the impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy in European countries," MPRA Paper 32998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00492085 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Koethenbuerger, Marko, 2008. "Federal tax-transfer policy and intergovernmental pre-commitment," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 16-31, January.
    6. Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2017. "Bailouts and Soft Budget Constraints in Decentralized Government: A Synthesis and Survey of an Alternative View of Intergovernmental Grant Policy," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 221(2), pages 113-134, June.
    7. Breuillé, Marie-Laure & Madiès, Thierry & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle, 2010. "Gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 205-214, September.
    8. Foremny, Dirk, 2014. "Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-110.
    9. Breuillé, Marie-Laure & Vigneault, Marianne, 2010. "Overlapping soft budget constraints," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 259-269, May.
    10. Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2013. "Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 338-356, April.
    11. Karolina Kaiser, 2008. "Restricted Bailouts and the Commitment Problem in Federations," Working Papers 062, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    12. Kothenburger, Marko, 2007. "Ex-post redistribution in a federation: Implications for corrective policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 481-496, April.
    13. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2008. "Too big or too small? A synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 551-559, November.
    14. Plachta, Robert C., 2008. "Fiscal Equalisation and the Soft Budget Constraint," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 08-8, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    15. Nobuo Akai & Motohiro Sato, 2019. "The role of matching grants as a commitment device in the federation model with a repeated soft budget setting," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 23-39, March.
    16. Eyraud, Luc & Lusinyan, Lusine, 2013. "Vertical fiscal imbalances and fiscal performance in advanced economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 571-587.
    17. Herold, Katharina, 2009. "Intergovernmental grants and financial autonomy under asymmetric information," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-2, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    18. Alice Y. Ouyang & Rui Li, 2021. "Fiscal decentralization and the default risk of Chinese local government debts," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 641-667, July.
    19. Aronsson, Thomas, 2010. "Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 187-195, July.
    20. Emilson Silva, 2015. "Efficient earmarking under decentralized fiscal commitments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(4), pages 683-701, August.
    21. Nobuo Akai & Motohiro Sato, 2005. "leadership meets soft budget," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-391, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    automatic correction mechanism; soft budget constraint;

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201212)68:4_365:pfpitp_2.0.tx_2-g. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/fa .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.