The role of matching grants as a commitment device in the federation model with a repeated soft budget setting
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00221-7
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Cited by:
- Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2022.
"On the effects of intergovernmental grants: a survey,"
Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization
2204, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
- Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago Penas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2022. "On the Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: A Survey," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2203, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2024.
"On the effects of intergovernmental grants: a survey,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(3), pages 856-908, June.
- Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2022. "On the effects of intergovernmental grants: a survey," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 2204, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
- Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Penas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2023. "On the Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: A Survey," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2310, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
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More about this item
Keywords
Soft budget; Matching grant; Repeated game; Commitment device;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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