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Assimilation, Immigration, and the Welfare State

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  • Masatoshi Jinno

Abstract

This study analyzes the effect of immigration on the pay-as-you-go social security system by incorporating the costs of assimilation. Owing to the costs, the net benefit for the natives by admitting immigrants is not always positive; it increases with the number of immigrants and decreases with increasing costs of assimilation. When the assimilation costs are low, there is a parameter range in the number of immigrants where both the net benefits for the natives and immigrants can be positive. This implies that the number of immigrants and their abilities play an important role when immigrants are admitted.

Suggested Citation

  • Masatoshi Jinno, 2011. "Assimilation, Immigration, and the Welfare State," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 67(1), pages 46-63, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201103)67:1_46:aiatws_2.0.tx_2-w
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X574182
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Masatoshi Jinno, 2013. "The impact of immigration under the defined-benefit pension system," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 28(21), pages 613-636.
    2. Yohei Sekiguchi & Masatoshi Jinno, 2018. "Beveridge Versus Bismarck Pension Systems: Considering Fertility Rates And Skill Distribution," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 63(05), pages 1141-1153, December.
    3. Jinno, Masatoshi & Yasuoka, Masaya, 2021. "Endogenous fertility and unemployment -Considering the effects of immigrants through school system," MPRA Paper 106379, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jinno, Masatoshi & Yasuoka, Masaya, 2022. "The effects of admittingi Immigrants: a look at Japan’s school and pension systems," MPRA Paper 115182, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Masatoshi Jinno & Masaya Yasuoka, 2022. "Economic benefits of immigration for natives: the effects of immigrants through the school system," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 69(2), pages 125-143, June.
    6. Gurgen Aslanyan, 2014. "The migration challenge for PAYG," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 1023-1038, October.
    7. Jinno, Masatoshi, 2018. "Calculating the net benefi t of admitting immigrants under the de fined-return-ratio pay-as-you-go pension system," MPRA Paper 84931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. repec:wsr:wpaper:y:2012:i:101 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Jinno, Masatoshi & Yasuoka, Masaya, 2024. "Effects of Relaxing Residence Status for Foreign Workers on Native Residents," MPRA Paper 120568, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    assimilation costs; pay-as-you-go social security; immigration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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