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A Probabilistic Voting Model of Indirect Taxation

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  • Emanuele Canegrati

Abstract

I analyze a probabilistic voting model where two office-motivated candidates choose an indirect taxation policy to maximize the probability of winning the election, in a society divided into a finite number of groups, whose members have different preferences for the consumption of goods. Results show how candidates must satisfy those groups whose political power is higher. In equilibrium the more powerful groups obtain lower tax rates on those goods they prefer more.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Canegrati, 2011. "A Probabilistic Voting Model of Indirect Taxation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 67(1), pages 27-45, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201103)67:1_27:apvmoi_2.0.tx_2-h
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X574173
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0210 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bas Jacobs & A. Lans Bovenberg, 2011. "Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 957-971, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    probabilistic voting theory; indirect taxation; public expenditure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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