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Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality: The Triumph of the Market over the State?

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  • Michael Rauscher

Abstract

It has been argued in the literature that interjurisdictional competition forces the public sector to increase its efficiency and thus helps to tame Leviathan governments. The paper addresses this hypothesis by means of a simple tax-competition model with a Leviathan state. It is seen that the effects that increased factor mobility has on the wastefulness of the public sector are ambiguous. A calibration of the model shows that the share of public funds wasted by the public sector may increase for parameter constellations which are not unrealistic.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Rauscher, 2000. "Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality: The Triumph of the Market over the State?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 89-105, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200009)57:1_89:icappt_2.0.tx_2-5
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rauscher, Michael, 2005. "Tax competition, capital mobility, and innovation in the public sector," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 54, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    2. Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Privatization, Government's Preference and Unionization Structure: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach," MPRA Paper 13028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. repec:bla:germec:v:8:y:2007:i::p:28-40 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Kangsik Choi & Yuanzhu Lu, 2009. "A Model Of Endogenous Payoff Motives And Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 203-223, September.
    5. Hernández-Murillo, Rubén, 2019. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 85-95.
    6. Choi, Kangsik, 2012. "Indirect Taxation and Privatization in a Model of Government's Preference," MPRA Paper 42968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Michael Rauscher, 2005. "Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 457-474, August.
    8. Eggert, Wolfgang & Sørensen, Peter Birch, 2008. "The effects of tax competition when politicians create rents to buy political support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1142-1163, June.
    9. Chu, Angus C. & Yang, C.C., 2012. "Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 177-188.
    10. Becker, Daniel Thomas, 2008. "Dynamic tax competition and public-sector modernisation," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 56, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    11. Michael Rauscher, 2004. "Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans," CESifo Working Paper Series 1140, CESifo.
    12. Choi, Kangsik, 2011. "Unions, government's preference, and privatization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2502-2508.
    13. Richter, Wolfram F., 2004. "Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 597-613, May.
    14. Brückner, Matthias, 2001. "Strategic delegation and international capital taxation," ZEI Working Papers B 22-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    15. Michael Rauscher, 2007. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Innovation in the Public Sector," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 28-40, February.
    16. Matsumoto, Mutsumi & Feehan, James P., 2010. "Capital-tax financing and scale economies in public-input production," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2-3), pages 116-121, May.
    17. Ruben Hernandez-Murillo, 2014. "Interjurisdictional Competition and Location Decisions of Firms," Working Papers 2014-36, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    18. Mutsumi Matsumoto, 2010. "Entry in tax competition: a note," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(6), pages 627-639, December.
    19. Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization," MPRA Paper 13844, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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