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Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

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  • Richter, Wolfram F.

Abstract

Delayed Integration ("DI") is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the receiving country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay home taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Origin Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor while a close substitute to the latter - the Nationality Principle - is underlying U.S. tax law. The paper studies the potential merits of DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the social cost of tax distortion and the social cost of wasteful government.
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Suggested Citation

  • Richter, Wolfram F., 2004. "Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 597-613, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:55:y:2004:i:3:p:597-613
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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Krieger, 2014. "Public Pensions and Immigration," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(2), pages 10-15, 07.
    2. Malte Dold & Tim Krieger, 2023. "The ideological use and abuse of Freiburg’s ordoliberalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 341-361, June.
    3. Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Oliver Busch & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2005. "Artificial Time Inconsistency as a Remedy for the Race to the Bottom (new title: Delayed Integration as a Possible Remedy for the Race to the Bottom)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1637, CESifo.
    4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2004. "Migration, Social Standards and Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-income Workers in the Industrialized Countries Against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration," NBER Working Papers 10798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Vilen Lipatov & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2010. "Optimal Income Taxation with Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 3108, CESifo.
    6. Vilen Lipatov & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2015. "Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 457-477, September.
    7. Tim Krieger, 2014. "Public Pensions and Immigration," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(02), pages 10-15, July.
    8. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2005. "Migration and Social Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-Income Workers in the Industrialized Countries Against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 375-393, August.
    9. Weichenrieder, Alfons J. & Busch, Oliver, 2007. "Delayed integration as a possible remedy for the race to the bottom," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 565-575, May.
    10. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:2:p:19116205 is not listed on IDEAS

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