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From Custom to Law, An Economic Rationale behind the Black Lettering

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  • Guido Rossi
  • Salvatore Spagano

Abstract

This article employs the number of rule recipients in order to explain the transformation of some customs into laws. The publication of rules may mark the reaching of the threshold number beyond which the spontaneous rule leaves room for the State intervention. In addition, the publication resolves a couple of questions that Hayek left unresolved. Examples are provided from ancient merchant customs and contemporary international law.

Suggested Citation

  • Guido Rossi & Salvatore Spagano, 2018. "From Custom to Law, An Economic Rationale behind the Black Lettering," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(4), pages 1109-1124, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:52:y:2018:i:4:p:1109-1124
    DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2018.1535953
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    Cited by:

    1. Zdybel, Karol B., 2023. "Spontaneous Norms in Law and Economics: A Sketch Typology," ILE Working Paper Series 66, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.

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