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Wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen zur Beeinflussung von Managergehältern

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  • Patloch Alexandra

    (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 1, Gebäude AD, 1020 Wien, Österreich Austria, Tel.: +43 1 31336–5079)

Abstract

Due to actions taken to moderate the level of management remuneration and its structure, the present article deals with the effectiveness of such governmental regulations. The ways of regulations differ around the world, but this article focuses on three particular measurements: the so-called Say on Pay, the tax deductibility of compensation, and the limitation of remuneration components. The aim of this article is to analyse existing empirical studies which deal with the three stated actions' effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Patloch Alexandra, 2017. "Wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen zur Beeinflussung von Managergehältern," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 66(2), pages 111-141, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:66:y:2017:i:2:p:111-141:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2017-0007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2013. "Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 951-996, December.
    2. Natasha Burns & Kristina Minnick, 2013. "Does Say-on-Pay Matter? Evidence from Say-on-Pay Proposals in the United States," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 233-258, May.
    3. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2000. "The Taxation of Executive Compensation," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 14, pages 1-44, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, 2013. "Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 527-563.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive remuneration; CEO-compensation; Say on Pay; Section 162(m); Tax deductibility of compensation; Managervergütung; Vorstandsvergütung; Vergütungsbeeinflussung; Abzugsbeschränkung von Gehältern; Steuerliche Abzugsfähigkeit; Beschränkung von Vergütungsteilen; Executive remuneration; CEO-compensation; Say on Pay; Section 162(m); Tax deductibility of compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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