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Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS

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  • Alexander Libman

Abstract

The paper addresses the problem of similarities and divergence of transition paths at the later stage of transition in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The main aim is to clarify the influence of specifics of government-business relations on economic reforms carried out at the later stage of transition in countries, which have been relatively less successful during the earlier transition. The paper discusses potential channels of influence of institutional organization of government-business relations on economic reforms and compares government-business relation models and paths of transition in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Libman, 2006. "Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 3(2), pages 263-288, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:liu:liucej:v:3:y:2006:i:2:p:263-288
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    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Government-business relations in post-Soviet space: The case of Central Asia," MPRA Paper 11874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Grivas Chiyaba & Carl Singleton, 2022. "Do natural resources and FDI tend to erode or support the development of national institutions?," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2022-02, Department of Economics, University of Reading, revised 30 May 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Post-Soviet economies; catching up reforms; institutional trap; government-business relations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General

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