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Nomination Commitee Attributes and Firm Performance: Evidence from Finance Companies in Malaysia

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  • Basiru Salisu KALLAMU

    (Putra Business School, Malaysia.)

Abstract

The paper examines the impact of nomination committee attributes on the performance of finance companies in Malaysia. Our panel data is composed of annual data for finance companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia over the period 2004 to 2011. The result indicates that finance expertise of directors’ on nomination committee influences accounting returns positively while membership of executive on nomination committee affects accounting returns negatively. This indicates that the requirement of Bank Negara that nomination committee should be composed of non-executive directors is appropriate and suggests that the regulators should recommend companies to include directors with finance expertise in the nomination committee in future policy formulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Basiru Salisu KALLAMU, 2016. "Nomination Commitee Attributes and Firm Performance: Evidence from Finance Companies in Malaysia," Journal of Economic and Social Thought, KSP Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 150-165, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksp:journ3:v:3:y:2016:i:1:p:150-165
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    Cited by:

    1. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nomination committee; independent directors; finance companies; firm performance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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