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Borrowers’ Participation in Group Borrowing

Author

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  • Ankur TUTLANI

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.)

Abstract

Borrowers’ participation in MFI group lending credit market is not insured because of the alternative sources of credit available. The question arises what is the ideal MFI interest rate to ensure borrowers’ participation which at the same time being financially viable for MFI. The paper attempts to answer this question and analyzes the borrowers’ trade-off of borrowing from MFI or from moneylender (ML). Results show that borrowers may find comparative advantage in borrowing individually from ML as compared to borrowing in a group from MFI if the transaction cost burden is high and their credit requirement is low.

Suggested Citation

  • Ankur TUTLANI, 2016. "Borrowers’ Participation in Group Borrowing," Turkish Economic Review, KSP Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 170-187, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksp:journ2:v:3:y:2016:i:1:p:170-187
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microfinance; Group lending; Informal finance; Transaction cost; Effective cost.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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