Rejtett gazdaság és adózási magatartás, 1996-2001
[The hidden economy and taxation-related behaviour, 1996-2001]
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References listed on IDEAS
- Sandmo, Agnar, 1981. "Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity--efficiency tradeoff," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 265-288, December.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, April.
- Kornai, János, 2000. "A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban [Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-22.
- Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
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Cited by:
- Karoly Fazekas & Gyorgy Molnar (ed.), 2011. "The Hungarian Labour Market 2011," The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbooks, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 2011, December.
- Fenyvesi, Éva & Vágány, Judit Bernadett, 2020. "A rejtett gazdaság néhány területének szisztematikus szakirodalmi áttekintése [A systematic literature review of some areas of the hidden economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 512-532.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
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