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A korlátozó szabályozástól az ösztönző szabályozásig. A közlekedés szabályozása az Európai Unióban és Magyarországon
[From restricting regulation to incentive regulation. Transport regulation in the European Union and Hungary]

Author

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  • Major, Iván

Abstract

A közlekedés szabályozása az Európai Unióban és Magyarországon A cikk az Európai Unió és Magyarország közlekedési rendszereinek hatékonysági problémái és az ágazati szabályozás közötti összefüggéseket elemzi. A közlekedés alacsony fokú hatékonysága és torz szerkezete az EU-tagországok és Magyarország egyik fő gazdasági veszteségforrásává vált az ezredfordulón. Az írás bemutatja, hogy az ösztönzéselmélet alapján kialakított ösztönző szabályozás eszközével lényegesen javítható a közlekedés gazdasági hatékonysága. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D8, L14, L51, R4.

Suggested Citation

  • Major, Iván, 2004. "A korlátozó szabályozástól az ösztönző szabályozásig. A közlekedés szabályozása az Európai Unióban és Magyarországon [From restricting regulation to incentive regulation. Transport regulation in th," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 501-529.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:686
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nagy, Benedek, 2012. "A repülőtéri zsúfoltságkezelési módszerek hatékonysága [The efficiency of methods to treat crowding in airports]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 74-91.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics

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