IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ksa/szemle/1917.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Haknigazdaság - egy dinamikus megbízó-ügynök modell
[The gig economy: a dynamic principal-agent model]

Author

Listed:
  • Bihary, Zsolt
  • Kerényi, Péter

Abstract

A haknigazdaság, amelyben a munkavállalók rövid távú, projektalapú munkát vállalnak, egyre inkább terjed az egész világon. Ebben a cikkben dinamikus megbízó-ügynök modell segítségével vizsgáljuk a munkáltatók és a munkavállalók viselkedését és interakcióját a haknigazdaságban. Javasolt modellünkben a munkavállaló korábbi döntései a dinamikusan változó és endogén részvételi korlátján keresztül befolyásolják a későbbi döntéseket. A munkavállaló heurisztikus döntési szabálya szerint elfogadja a munkáltató által kínált szerződést, ha annak várható hasznossága magasabb, mint a munkavállaló referenciaértéke. Ez a referenciaérték a korábbi tapasztalatain, a korábban elért fizetéseken alapszik. A cikkben megfogalmazzuk a munkáltató általános sztochasztikus kontrollproblémáját, és a determinisztikus határesetben levezetjük annak optimális megoldását. Meghatározzuk a munkavállaló elérhető nettó bérét és a munkáltató nyereségét is. Eredményeink alapján a munkavállaló és a munkáltató közötti béralku egy "kivárásjáték": aki megengedheti magának, hogy türelmesebb legyen, annak jobb az alkupozíciója, és nagyobb részesedést kap a munka gyümölcséből.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C73, D82, D86, J33, J41

Suggested Citation

  • Bihary, Zsolt & Kerényi, Péter, 2020. "Haknigazdaság - egy dinamikus megbízó-ügynök modell [The gig economy: a dynamic principal-agent model]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 748-761.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1917
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2020.7-8.748
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kszemle.hu/tartalom/letoltes.php?id=1917
    Download Restriction: Registration and subscription. 3-month embargo period to non-subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18414/KSZ.2020.7-8.748?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    2. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2019. "Optimal self-enforcement and termination," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 161-186.
    3. Kuhn, Kristine M., 2016. "The Rise of the “Gig Economy” and Implications for Understanding Work and Workers," Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 157-162, March.
    4. Yuliy Sannikov, 2008. "A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 957-984.
    5. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 2016. "The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015," Working Papers 603, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    6. PETER M. DeMARZO & YULIY SANNIKOV, 2006. "Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2681-2724, December.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    8. Gordon Burtch & Seth Carnahan & Brad N. Greenwood, 2018. "Can You Gig It? An Empirical Examination of the Gig Economy and Entrepreneurial Activity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(12), pages 5497-5520, December.
    9. Gerald Friedman, 2014. "Workers without employers: shadow corporations and the rise of the gig economy," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 171-188, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zsolt Bihary & P'eter Cs'oka & P'eter Ker'enyi & Alexander Szimayer, 2019. "Self-respecting worker in the precarious gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," Papers 1902.10021, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    2. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2019. "Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(3), pages 1363-1429, June.
    4. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    5. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2016. "Liquidity and Risk Management: Coordinating Investment and Compensation Policies," 2016 Meeting Papers 1703, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
    7. Nadide Banu Olcay, 2016. "Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 255-288, December.
    8. Kaitong Hu & Zhenjie Ren & Junjian Yang, 2019. "Principal-agent problem with multiple principals," Working Papers hal-02088486, HAL.
    9. Jakv{s}a Cvitani'c & Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2015. "Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems," Papers 1510.07111, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2017.
    10. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 127, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    11. Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2012. "Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 268-306.
    12. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
    13. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2011. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(9), pages 2865-2894.
    14. Cvitanić, Jakša & Xing, Hao, 2018. "Asset pricing under optimal contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 142-180.
    15. Ulbricht, Robert, 2016. "Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    16. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
    17. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    18. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
    19. Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2025. "Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 143-176, January.
    20. Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2017. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2006-2065.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1917. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Odon Sok (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kszemle.hu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.