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Adómorál, bizalom és kényszerek - adózási motivációk Magyarországon korrupciós botrányok idején
[Tax morale, trust and constraints: Tax-compliance motivations in Hungary during corruption scandals]

Author

Listed:
  • Boda, Zsolt
  • Bartha, Attila

Abstract

A viselkedési közgazdaságtani és a gazdaságpszichológiai kutatások szerint az adózási magatartást részben kényszerű, részben önkéntes motivációk, az adómorál alakítják. Tanulmányunk ezekre a megközelítésekre összpontosít, tudomásunk szerint ez az első hazai kutatás, amely az intézményi bizalomnak és az eljárási méltányosságnak az adófizetési attitűdökkel kapcsolatos összefüggéseit elemzi. Két - 2013-ban, illetve 2015-ben készült - reprezentatív felmérés alapján vizsgáljuk a magyar állampolgárok adózási motivációit. Az adatfelvételek időpontjának sajátossága, hogy a köztes időszakban az adóhatóság (NAV) működését korrupciós botrányok árnyékolták be. Várakozásunknak megfelelően az intézményi bizalom gyengesége és az észlelt korrupció jelentősen rombolják az adómorált, miközben a kényszerű adófizetést nem befolyásolják érdemben. Vizsgálatunk hipotézisünket cáfoló eredménye, hogy az önkéntes adófizetési hajlandóság Magyarországon is erősebb a kényszerűnél. Végül hipotézisünkkel összhangban szignifikáns és az egyéb tényezőktől függetlenül is kimutatható a NAV-botrányok negatív hatása az adóhatóság iránti bizalomra. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: B25, H26, P16.

Suggested Citation

  • Boda, Zsolt & Bartha, Attila, 2016. "Adómorál, bizalom és kényszerek - adózási motivációk Magyarországon korrupciós botrányok idején [Tax morale, trust and constraints: Tax-compliance motivations in Hungary during corruption scandals]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1021-1045.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1654
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2016.10.1021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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