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Centralizáció - utolsó mentsvár vagy a bukás előszele?. A tervezés általános természetéről
[Centralization: last chance or a foreshadowing of collapse?. On the general nature of planning]

Author

Listed:
  • Bakonyi, Zoltán

Abstract

Az 1930-as évek Mises, Hayek és Lange kalkulációs, valamint az 1990-es évek Mintzberg és Ansoff vállalati tervezési vitája között számos hasonlóságot azonosíthatunk. E viták során felmerült érvekre alapozva egy általános tervezési modellt fogalmazhatunk meg, amely egyaránt értelmezhető nemzetgazdaságokra és vállalatokra. Az általános tervezési modell a szervezeti erőforrásokat övező információs és magatartási oldalról, valamint a koordinációs mechanizmusokból vezeti le a tervezés centralizációját. A centralizált tervezés globális hatékonyságot, a decentralizált pedig lokális válaszképességet tehet lehetővé. Mindkét szélsőség túlzott hajszolása a szervezeti működés kudarcához vezet. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: B20, L10, P11.

Suggested Citation

  • Bakonyi, Zoltán, 2015. "Centralizáció - utolsó mentsvár vagy a bukás előszele?. A tervezés általános természetéről [Centralization: last chance or a foreshadowing of collapse?. On the general nature of planning]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 305-328.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1540
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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