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Economic Consequences of Global Accounting Convergence: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Satoshi Taguchi

    (Faculty of Commerce, Doshisya University, Japan)

  • Masayuki Ueeda

    (School of Business, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan)

  • Kazunori Miwa

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Japan)

  • Satoru Mizutani

    (Faculty of Business Administration, Tezukayama University)

Abstract

This paper examines whether the movement toward convergence of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has ended. The methodology for this research is based on comparative institutional analysis and experimental game theory. In addition,we adopt a 3×3 coordination game because an essential factor of global accounting convergence is the coordination of accounting standards. The results confirm the termination of a movement toward the convergence of IFRS. Namely, our experiments indicate that global accounting convergence toward IFRS may not be successful. This is because some “egoist” countries maintain their initial systems and do not enter long term cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Satoshi Taguchi & Masayuki Ueeda & Kazunori Miwa & Satoru Mizutani, 2013. "Economic Consequences of Global Accounting Convergence: An Experimental Study," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 3, pages 103-120, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kob:tjrevi:dec2013:v:3:p:103-120
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NIA Approach; IFRS; Convergence; Coordination Game; Equilibrium Selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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