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Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games

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  • Sau-Him Lau
  • Vai-Lam Mui

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  • Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2012. "Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 167-188, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:72:y:2012:i:2:p:167-188
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9249-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Coordination and Conflict Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 153-183, September.
    2. Gary Bornstein & David Budescu & Shmuel Zamir, 1997. "Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(3), pages 384-406, June.
    3. Bhaskar, V., 2000. "Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 247-262, August.
    4. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
    5. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January.
    6. Ward, Hugh, 1998. "A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Politics of Taking It in Turns," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 355-387, April.
    7. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
    8. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle, 2012. "Which Way to Cooperate," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(563), pages 1042-1068, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xue, Lian & Sitzia, Stefania & Turocy, Theodore L., 2023. "Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    2. John Duffy & Ernest K. Lai & Wooyoung Lim, 2017. "Coordination via correlation: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 265-304, August.
    3. He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin, 2020. "Compromise and coordination: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 216-233.
    4. Zhao, Shuchen, 2021. "Taking turns in continuous time," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 257-279.
    5. Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017. "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 687-699.
    6. Tjaša Bjedov & Thierry Madiès & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Communication And Coordination In A Two-Stage Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1519-1540, July.
    7. Kloosterman, Andrew & Mago, Shakun, 2023. "The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 812-832.
    8. Timothy Cason & Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2013. "Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 335-357, October.
    9. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth, 2013. "Alternating or compensating? An experimentrepeated sequential best shot game," Jena Economics Research Papers 2013-045, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Lian Xue & Stefania Sitzia & Theodore L. Turocy, 2022. "Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 22-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    11. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth, 2018. "Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 873-891, September.
    12. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017. "It's your turn: experiments with three-player public good games," MPRA Paper 76565, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W., 2014. "Symmetric play in repeated allocation games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 25-67.
    14. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan, 2019. "Path of intertemporal cooperation and limits to turn-taking behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 21-36.
    15. Sibly, Hugh & Tisdell, John, 2018. "Cooperation and turn taking in finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemmas: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 49-56.
    16. He, Simin & Zou, Xinlu, 2024. "Public goods provision in a network formation game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 104-131.

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    2. Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017. "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 687-699.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; Coordination; Turn taking; Intertemporal cooperation; C70; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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