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On the coase theorem and coalitional stability: the principle of equal relative concession

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  • Partha Gangopadhyay

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  • Partha Gangopadhyay, 2000. "On the coase theorem and coalitional stability: the principle of equal relative concession," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 179-191, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:48:y:2000:i:2:p:179-191
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005142606780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    3. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156.
    4. repec:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:216:p:517-20 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Aivazian, Varouj A. & Callen, Jeffrey L., 2023. "The Coase Theorem and the empty core: Inspecting the entrails after four decades," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    2. Gangopadhyay Partha, 2008. "Irrationality, Non-equilibrium Conflict and Complex Dynamics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 111-123, January.
    3. Paul Weirich, 2011. "Exclusion from the social contract," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 10(2), pages 148-169, May.
    4. Dube, Partha Pratim & Gangopadhyay, Partha, 2015. "MGNREGA policies and deterrence of development in rural India: An analytical approach," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 5(2), pages 101-113.

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