The interaction of a size-dependent tax policy and financial frictions: evidence from a tax reform in Japan

This study examines the effects of the interaction of a size-dependent tax policy that exempts firms whose stated capital is at or below a certain threshold from taxation and financial frictions on firm growth and financing. Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows: First, firms with lower productivity, a positive potential tax benefit, and smaller stated capital are more likely to conduct the cash-out capital reduction to or below the threshold in response to the policy. Second, this capital reduction causes ex-post lower firm growth and fewer debt. Third, such causal effects are observed for firms with less cash flow ratios. These results indicate that the interaction between a size-dependent tax policy and financial constraints deters firm growth. Plain English Summary The interaction of a size-dependent tax policy that exempts firms whose stated capital is at or below a certain threshold from taxation and financial frictions deters firm growth. We use the introduction of the pro forma standard taxation system in Japan that exempts firms (SMEs), whose stated capital is at or below a threshold, from taxation to empirically examine how firms react to this institutional change and how such a reaction systematically affects their financing and real outcomes. We show that size-dependent tax policies can have a significant effect on firms’ growth and financing through financial constraints. It indicates that firms decide whether to obtain an SME status by considering the trade-off between a more severe borrowing constraint and a smaller tax payment. The results obtained in this study indicate that such indirect effects of a size-dependent tax policy on firm dynamics should be considered when designing the policy. Moreover, governments should understand that an institutional change in their tax systems generates a heterogeneous reaction from firms and thus has heterogeneous effects on their dynamics.