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Associations versus registration as alternative strategies of small firms

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  • Grigor Sukiassyan
  • Jeffrey Nugent

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  • Grigor Sukiassyan & Jeffrey Nugent, 2008. "Associations versus registration as alternative strategies of small firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 147-161, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:31:y:2008:i:2:p:147-161
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-007-9085-7
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    1. Geweke, John, 1989. "Bayesian Inference in Econometric Models Using Monte Carlo Integration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1317-1339, November.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Lorenzo Cappellari & Stephen P. Jenkins, 2006. "Calculation of multivariate normal probabilities by simulation, with applications to maximum simulated likelihood estimation," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 6(2), pages 156-189, June.
    4. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    5. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "Property Rights and Finance," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Erik Berglöf & Gérard Roland (ed.), The Economics of Transition, chapter 7, pages 213-242, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Woodruff, Christopher, 1998. "Contract enforcement and trade liberalization in Mexico's footwear industry," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 979-991, June.
    7. Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Contract Enforcement in Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Luc Laeven & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership, and Firm Size," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 601-614, November.
    9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    10. Smith, Richard J & Blundell, Richard W, 1986. "An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 679-685, May.
    11. Heckman, James J, 1978. "Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 931-959, July.
    12. McPherson, Michael A. & Liedholm, Carl, 1996. "Determinants of small and micro enterprise registration: Results from surveys in Niger and Swaziland," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 481-487, March.
    13. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1979. "The Estimation of a Simultaneous-Equation Tobit Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 169-181, February.
    14. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Love, Inessa, 2002. "Investor protection, ownership, and the cost of capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2834, The World Bank.
    15. Marty Chen, 2005. "Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-10, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    16. Maloney, William F, 1999. "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 13(2), pages 275-302, May.
    17. Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity," Cahiers de recherche 0724, CIRPEE.
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    Cited by:

    1. Annen, Kurt, 2013. "Social capital as a substitute for formality: Evidence from Bolivia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 82-92.
    2. Smriti Sharma, 2014. "Benefits of a registration policy for microenterprise performance in India," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 153-164, January.
    3. repec:kqi:journl:2017-1-1 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation costs; Contract enforcement; Efficiency of the legal system; Microenterprise; Business associations; Mexico; D21; D63; O12; O17; L26;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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