IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/rqfnac/v43y2014i3p423-440.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Secured debt and managerial incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Alderson
  • Naresh Bansal
  • Brian Betker

Abstract

Financial theory holds that firms can control agency costs through the use of short-term and secured debt. We examine the relation between the use of secured debt and the incentive of the manager to increase the risk of the firm, as measured by vega. We find that firms utilize secured debt to a lesser extent when managerial volatility sensitivity is higher. Our results suggest that these same firms employ short-term debt as the primary tool to control risk-shifting. Managers with a high risk appetite avoid secured debt, but appear to do so without compromising the interests of the shareholders. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Alderson & Naresh Bansal & Brian Betker, 2014. "Secured debt and managerial incentives," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 423-440, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:43:y:2014:i:3:p:423-440
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-013-0380-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11156-013-0380-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11156-013-0380-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barclay, Michael J & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1995. "The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(3), pages 899-917, July.
    2. Larcker, David F. & Rusticus, Tjomme O., 2010. "On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 186-205, April.
    3. Jian Cao & Indrarini Laksmana, 2010. "The effect of capital market pressures on the association between R&D spending and CEO option compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 273-300, February.
    4. Kenneth Shaw, 2012. "CEO incentives and the cost of debt," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 323-346, April.
    5. Leland, Hayne E & Toft, Klaus Bjerre, 1996. "Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(3), pages 987-1019, July.
    6. John Core & Wayne Guay, 2002. "Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 613-630, June.
    7. Barnea, Amir & Haugen, Robert A & Senbet, Lemma W, 1980. "A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1223-1234, December.
    8. Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, 2010. "Capital Structure and Debt Structure," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(12), pages 4242-4280, December.
    9. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    10. Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, 2007. "Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1551-1588, August.
    11. Chia-Jane Wang, 2012. "Board size and firm risk-taking," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 519-542, May.
    12. John D. Knopf & Jouahn Nam & John H. Thornton, 2002. "The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(2), pages 801-813, April.
    13. Stulz, ReneM. & Johnson, Herb, 1985. "An analysis of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 501-521, December.
    14. Paul Brockman & Xiumin Martin & Emre Unlu, 2010. "Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1123-1161, June.
    15. Matthew T. Billett & David C. Mauer & Yilei Zhang, 2010. "Stockholder and Bondholder Wealth Effects of CEO Incentive Grants," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 463-487, June.
    16. Hayes, Rachel M. & Lemmon, Michael & Qiu, Mingming, 2012. "Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 174-190.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kanwal Iqbal Khan & Faisal Qadeer & Mário Nuno Mata & José Chavaglia Neto & Qurat ul An Sabir & Jéssica Nunes Martins & José António Filipe, 2021. "Core Predictors of Debt Specialization: A New Insight to Optimal Capital Structure," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(9), pages 1-25, April.
    2. Li, Ying & Li, Lingxiao & Zhu, Bing, 2023. "Executive Compensation and Secured Debt: Evidence from REITs," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277606, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Yomna Abdulla & Viet Anh Dang & Arif Khurshed, 2016. "Debt maturity and initial public offerings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 1129-1165, November.
    4. Kanwal Iqbal Khan & Faisal Qadeer & Mário Nuno Mata & Rui Miguel Dantas & João Xavier Rita & Jéssica Nunes Martins, 2021. "Debt Market Trends and Predictors of Specialization: An Analysis of Pakistani Corporate Sector," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(5), pages 1-16, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li, Ying & Li, Lingxiao & Zhu, Bing, 2023. "Executive Compensation and Secured Debt: Evidence from REITs," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277606, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Hong, Jieying, 2019. "Managerial compensation incentives and corporate debt maturity: Evidence from FAS 123R," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 388-414.
    3. Castro, Paula & Keasey, Kevin & Amor-Tapia, Borja & Tascon, Maria T. & Vallascas, Francesco, 2020. "Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Dang, Viet A. & Phan, Hieu V., 2016. "CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity structure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 38-54.
    5. Paul Brockman & Tao Ma & Jianfang Ye, 2015. "CEO Compensation Risk and Timely Loss Recognition," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1-2), pages 204-236, January.
    6. Choi, Daewoung & Lee, Jinsook & Yi, Ha-Chin, 2023. "Managerial risk-taking incentives and debt diversity: Evidence from FAS 123R," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).
    7. Chesney, Marc & Stromberg, Jacob & Wagner, Alexander F. & Wolff, Vincent, 2020. "Managerial incentives to take asset risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    8. Jiyeon Yun & James M. Carson & David L. Eckles, 2023. "Executive compensation and corporate risk management," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 90(2), pages 521-557, June.
    9. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    10. Kenneth Shaw, 2012. "CEO incentives and the cost of debt," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 323-346, April.
    11. repec:cte:wbrepe:wb1501 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Chengru Hu & Wei Jiang, 2019. "Managerial risk incentives and accounting conservatism," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 781-813, April.
    13. Shen, Carl Hsin-han & Zhang, Hao, 2013. "CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1176-1194.
    14. Alderson, Michael J. & Bansal, Naresh & Betker, Brian L., 2014. "CEO turnover and the reduction of price sensitivity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 376-386.
    15. Baixauli-Soler, J. Samuel & Belda-Ruiz, Maria & Sanchez-Marin, Gregorio, 2015. "Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 451-463.
    16. Chen, Yangyang & Hasan, Iftekhar & Saffar, Walid & Zolotoy, Leon, 2021. "Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firms’ Choice of Debt Structure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    17. Yangyang Chen & Cameron Truong & Madhu Veeraraghavan, 2015. "CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and the Cost of Equity Capital," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7-8), pages 915-946, September.
    18. Chu, Yongqiang & Liu, Ming & Ma, Tao & Li, Xinming, 2020. "Executive compensation and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from private loan contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    19. Canil, Jean & Karpavičius, Sigitas, 2022. "Managerial risk-taking incentives and cash holding in U.S. firms: Evidence from FAS 123R," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 605-628.
    20. Liqiang Chen, 2014. "CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(9-10), pages 1269-1308, November.
    21. Jie Chen & Woon Sau Leung & Wei Song & Davide Avino, 2018. "Does CDS trading affect risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation?," Working Papers 2018-19, Swansea University, School of Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Secured debt; Managerial incentives; Executive compensation; Financing policy; G30; G32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:43:y:2014:i:3:p:423-440. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.