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TARP’s deadbeat banks

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  • Linus Wilson

Abstract

This paper tests whether poorly capitalized banks with troubled loan books are more likely to miss their bailout dividends. Privately held banks with weaker core capital ratios, more charged off loans, more allowances for loan losses, and more non-performing loans are more likely to miss their Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) dividends. Banks that issue non-cumulative preferred stock are also more likely to be TARP deadbeats. In addition, banks that missed a bailout dividend in the prior quarter are significantly more likely to miss the next bailout dividend. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Linus Wilson, 2013. "TARP’s deadbeat banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 651-674, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:41:y:2013:i:4:p:651-674
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-012-0327-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    14. Wilson, Linus & Wu, Yan Wendy, 2012. "Escaping TARP," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 32-42.
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    Cited by:

    1. Calabrese, Raffaella & Degl’Innocenti, Marta & Osmetti, Silvia Angela, 2017. "The effectiveness of TARP-CPP on the US banking industry: A new copula-based approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 1029-1037.
    2. Ulf Mohrmann & Jan Riepe, 2019. "The link between the share of banks’ Level 3 assets and their default risk and default costs," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1163-1189, May.
    3. Michael B. Imerman, 0. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-36.
    4. Croci, Ettore & Hertig, Gerard & Nowak, Eric, 2016. "Decision-making during the credit crisis: Did the Treasury let commercial banks fail?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 476-497.
    5. Allen N. Berger, 2018. "The Benefits and Costs of the TARP Bailouts: A Critical Assessment," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(02), pages 1-29, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bailout; Banking; Capital Purchase Program; Dividends; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act; Hybrid securities; Preferred stock; SBLF; Small Business Lending Fund; Trust preferred; TRUPS; TARP; G21; G28; G38;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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