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Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2018/2019

Author

Listed:
  • Rossitza Kotzeva

    (European Commission)

  • David Kovo

    (European Commission)

  • Szabolcs Lorincz

    (European Commission)

  • Geza Sapi

    (European Commission)

  • Lluis Sauri

    (European Commission)

  • Tommaso Valletti

    (Imperial College London)

Abstract

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and state aids. This year’s article provides first a general presentation of the role of the Chief Competition Economist’s team and surveys some of the main achievements of the Directorate General for Competition over 2018/2019. The article then reviews the Siemens/Alstom merger, the Google Android case, as well as two state aid cases that related to a public service compensation for obligations that involved press delivery in France and Italy.

Suggested Citation

  • Rossitza Kotzeva & David Kovo & Szabolcs Lorincz & Geza Sapi & Lluis Sauri & Tommaso Valletti, 2019. "Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2018/2019," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(4), pages 551-578, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09739-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09739-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, 2021. "Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power [Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly]," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(640), pages 3122-3144.
    2. Andrea Amelio & Thomas Buettner & Cyril Hariton & Gábor Koltay & Penelope Papandropoulos & Geza Sapi & Tommaso Valletti & Hans Zenger, 2018. "Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2017/2018," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(4), pages 653-679, December.
    3. Choi, Jay Pil & Stefanadis, Christodoulos, 2001. "Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 52-71, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Liliane Karlinger & Dimitrios Magos & Pierre Régibeau & Hans Zenger, 2020. "Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2019/2020," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(4), pages 783-814, December.
    2. Gorwa, Robert, 2024. "The Politics of Platform Regulation: How Governments Shape Online Content Moderation," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 299876, December.
    3. Thomas Buettner & Daniel Coublucq & Rossitza Kotzeva & Lluis Sauri-Romero & Pierre Régibeau, 2022. "Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2021/2022," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(4), pages 449-487, December.
    4. Steffen, Nico & Wiewiorra, Lukas & Kroon, Peter, 2021. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung in der Plattform- und Datenökonomie," WIK Discussion Papers 481, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.

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