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The U.S. Federal Trade Commission at 100: A Symposium on FTC Economics

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  • Joseph Farrell

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  • Joseph Farrell, 2015. "The U.S. Federal Trade Commission at 100: A Symposium on FTC Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 1-3, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:46:y:2015:i:1:p:1-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-014-9443-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 947-968, June.
    2. Michael Salinger & Pauline Ippolito & Joel Schrag, 2007. "Economics at the FTC: Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Settlements and Behavioral Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 31(2), pages 85-105, September.
    3. Louis Kaplow, 2013. "Competition Policy and Price Fixing," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 10005.
    4. Julie Carlson & Leemore Dafny & Beth Freeborn & Pauline Ippolito & Brett Wendling, 2013. "Economics at the FTC: Physician Acquisitions, Standard Essential Patents, and Accuracy of Credit Reporting," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(4), pages 303-326, December.
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