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The ‘minimal’ state reconsidered: governance on the margin

Author

Listed:
  • J. R. Clark

    (The University of Tennessee)

  • Benjamin Powell

    (Texas Tech University)

Abstract

Classical liberal scholars have defined a “minimal state” as performing certain basic functions that include the provision of policing, courts, and national defense. We argue that these functions need not be fully provided by the state. Private provision of all three of these functions exists. Thus a truly minimal state would provide these functions only on the margins where private provision fails. Thus, a truly minimal state is much more minimal than scholars have traditionally envisioned.

Suggested Citation

  • J. R. Clark & Benjamin Powell, 2019. "The ‘minimal’ state reconsidered: governance on the margin," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 119-130, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:32:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11138-017-0400-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-017-0400-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Stringham, Edward Peter, 2015. "Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199365166.
    5. Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne & Thomas K. Duncan, 2014. "A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 29(Spring 20), pages 51-55.
    6. Powell, Benjamin & Wilson, Bart J., 2008. "An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 669-686, June.
    7. Christopher Coyne & David S. Lucas, 2016. "Economists Have No Defense: A Critical Review of National Defense in Economics Textbooks," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 65-83.
    8. Dwight Lee, 1989. "The impossibility of a desirable minimal state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 277-284, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Minimal state; Private provision of public goods; Taxation; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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